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Banking and financial sector performance is crucial to
economic growth as evidenced by literature (Levine, 1997
among others). Studies have shown that this causality usu-
ally runs from the financial sector to growth (Rousseau &
Wachtel, 1998). In that regard performance of the financial
intermediaries is also important for economic growth. As the
2008 Global Financial Crisis has shown, banks’ balance sheet
problems may lead to a contraction of credit to the real sector
eventually triggering a recession with serious consequences.
Moving from this premise, in this paper we evaluate the
drivers of equity returns for financial intermediaries in an
emerging market setting such as Turkey. In doing so we are the
first in literature to use equity returns as a risk factor for* Corresponding author. Tel.: þ1 212 217 4929; fax: þ1 212 217 4970.
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http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.bir.2013.12.002evaluating bank activities in Turkey. We are also among the
first in literature to study the impact of maturity composition
as well as diversification of income sources for banks in
Turkey on their overall equity risk. We believe our results are
important in understanding the Turkish economic miracle
(Turkey has demonstrated a phenomenal average growth rate
of 5.72% between 2002 and 2009 mostly fueled by extension
of credit by the banking system.) of the last decade and can be
used by other researchers who study banking and equity
market in general in Turkey for the same period.
Another aim of this paper is to check whether in Turkey
foreign ownership leads to lower risk for the banking system.
There are conflicting views on this issue and the verdict is not
yet out. While there is research by economists such as Micco,
Panizza, and Yanez (2004) that has shown that in developing
countries in general foreign banks usually have higher profit-
ability and lower overhead costs compared to local ones, there
are also recent studies that argue this relationship may not
hold. For instance, by using stochastic frontier analysis for a
sample of 2095 commercial banks in 105 countries Lensink,
Meesters, and Naaborg (2008) showed that foreign owner-
ship negatively affects bank efficiency.
In the case of Turkey, most studies suggest foreign banks
are usually more efficient and less risky. Among these Akin,ting by Elsevier B.V. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
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Fig. 1. ISE 100 USD-based index. The figure shows the daily closing values of
the USD-based ISE 100 Index for the study period and the Central Bank of the
Republic of Turkey’s (CBRT) daily USD buying rates. Exchange rates prior to
January 1, 2005, have been reduced by one million to reflect the elimination of
the six zeros at the end of the currency. Source: Istanbul Stock Exchange and
the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey.
24 E. Ozsoz et al. / Borsa I_stanbul Review 14 (2014) 23e31Bayyurt, and Zaim (2013) recently showed that foreign banks
are more efficient than domestic ones and even were so during
the Global Financial Crisis.1 Based on their results, we can
also expect to see lower equity volatility for banks held in
foreign ownership compared to domestic ones. In that regard,
we believe our study brings an important contribution to this
debate both in Turkey and in emerging markets in general.
The paper is organized in the following fashion: in the next
section we highlight some of the changes in the Turkish
economy during the study period; Section 3 reviews previous
research on this issue; in Section 4 the dataset is presented;
Section 5 provides the empirical estimation; Section 6 pro-
vides our main findings and Section 7 concludes.
2. Developments in the Turkish economy and on the stock
exchange during the study period
As mentioned earlier Turkey has achieved an average
growth rate of 5.72% between 2002 and 2009 which corre-
sponds to our study period of Turkish banking stocks. During
the same period Turkish export volume increased 60%2 and
the foreign direct investment (FDI) flows into the country
increased from less than 1 billion US Dollars (2002) to over
6.8 billion US dollars (2009). In terms of relative size to GDP
this corresponds to an increase from 0.46% of GDP to 1.2%.
Turkish stock market performance is also noteworthy during
this period. As shown in Fig. 1 the ISE 100 returns have
increased more than six-fold between 2002 and 2008 (from a
reading of $318.47 on October 1, 2002 to over $2600 on Jan 8,
2008) before falling in 2008 as the Global Financial Crisis
spread to Emerging Markets. The subsequent rise in the US
Dollar to Turkish Lira (TL) exchange rate can be seen in the
same figure. The Global Financial Crisis brought with it
sudden portfolio reversals from all emerging markets, causing
depreciation of the local currencies. The exchange rate went
up from 1.15 TL per USD in the first week of August 2008 to
over 1.69 TL per USD in the last week of October 2008 as
shown in the Figure. This sharp increase in such a short period
is directly the outcome of crisis. The exchange rate stabilized
as the effects of the crisis faded over time, and by the end of
our study period (June 2009) the TL/USD had stabilized in the
1.5e1.6 TL/USD range. Economic management by the
Turkish Central Bank was instrumental in this stabilization.
3. Literature review
One of the earliest papers in literature that examines the
relationship between volatility of equity returns and diversi-
fication of market value was written by Templeton and
Severiens (1992) who find that increases in diversification of
bank activities result in diminishing marginal decreases in risk
and that diversification of bank activities does not appear to1 For more on Turkish banks and ownership structure see studies by Bektas
and Kaymak (2009), Aysan and Ceyhan (2008), Isik and Hassan (2003), Isik
(2007).
2 Between January 2003 and June 2009.have an important effect on measures of systematic risk.
Saunders and Walter (1994) simulate mergers between bank
holding companies and non-bank firms and show that there are
risk-reduction benefits of diversification. In more recent pa-
pers, Reichert and Wall (2000) examine return on equity for
US banks from 1991 to 1997 and find substantial potential
gains for from diversification in support of the 1999
GrammeLeacheBliley legislation in the US.
However, there also studies that fail to support these find-
ings. For instance; Demsetz and Strahan (1997) follow the
work of Templeton and Severiens (1992) and show that
although large bank holding companies (BHCs) are better
diversified than small BHCs, there is not necessarily any sig-
nificant difference in terms of their risk reduction. They
attribute the higher risk potential of larger BHCs to their lower
capital ratios and larger commercial and industrial loan
portfolios.
DeYoung and Roland (2001) examine the impact of
deregulation in the US in the 90s and the subsequent shift in
banks’ sales mix toward non-interest income such as fee-based
financial services and securitization on their equity risk and
income. They find that as the average bank tilts “its product
mix toward fee-based activities and away from traditional
lending activities. the bank’s revenue volatility; its degree of
total leverage, and the level of its earnings all increase [which
implies]. increased earnings volatility (because earnings
volatility is the product of revenue volatility and the degree of
total leverage) and . a possible risk premium.” In another
related study, Stiroh (2006) uses equity data on BHCs to
evaluate the effects of BHCs’ loan and revenue composition
on their risk. His contribution to the literature is unique in the
sense that it emphasizes market-based assessment of risk and
return rather than accounting data assessment as most of
previous literature has done. As argued by Stiroh (2006)
market-based assessment provides forward looking perspec-
tive in terms of expected returns while accounting data is
backward-looking. His results reaffirm those of DeYoung and
Roland (2001) in the sense that “investment banking,
servicing, securitization income, gains from loan sales . are
Table 1
Return summary statistics.
Quarter No of banks Std of monthly returns Average monthly returns
2002q4 10 32.58 8.72
2003q1 10 18.72 0.26
2003q2 10 15.02 5.31
2003q3 10 11.42 2.59
2003q4 10 17.88 18.47
2004q1 10 14.60 4.68
2004q2 10 10.36 2.14
2004q3 10 9.83 8.63
2004q4 11 17.18 10.65
2005q1 11 19.02 11.17
2005q2 11 10.77 5.57
2005q3 11 12.47 9.54
2005q4 11 18.38 7.23
2006q1 12 17.76 2.50
2006q2 12 13.87 4.95
2006q3 12 6.89 2.75
2006q4 12 13.46 1.37
2007q1 12 9.70 2.30
2007q2 12 8.36 1.64
2007q3 13 10.94 5.24
2007q4 13 7.36 0.40
2008q1 13 14.15 14.60
2008q2 13 22.59 6.36
2008q3 13 29.33 8.74
2008q4 13 16.46 8.92
2009q1 13 14.54 2.36
2009q2 13 19.36 21.84
2009q3 13 11.84 11.01
2009q4 13 15.83 4.96
2010q1 13 11.49 1.92
This table shows the median standard deviation of monthly returns and the
median of the monthly returns per quarter. Monthly return data is obtained
from Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE). The data spans from the fourth quarter of
2002 to the first quarter of 2010.
3 From now on we refer about the average monthly returns simply as
25E. Ozsoz et al. / Borsa I_stanbul Review 14 (2014) 23e31particularly volatile activities” for banks and increase risk for
their equities. In a more recent paper Hirtle and Stiroh (2007)
examine the impact of banks’ retail intensity on performance
from 1997 to 2004 and find that “an increased focus on retail
banking across U.S. banks is linked to significantly lower
equity market and accounting returns for all banks but lower
volatility for only the largest banking companies”. Baele, De
Jonghe, and Vander Vennet (2007) analyze whether or not
“functionally diversified banks have a comparative advantage
in terms of long-term performance/risk profile compared to
their specialized competitors.” Their study uses a dataset of
European banks and analyzes the return/risk trade-off as a
result of diversification. They find that “diversification of
revenue streams from distinct financial activities increases the
systematic risk of banks while the effect on the idiosyncratic
risk component is non-linear and predominantly downward-
sloping.”
All of the studies mentioned above focus on the case of
developed banking systems (the US and Europe.) Literature that
studies the relationship between risk in equity returns and
diversification of bank activities is limited in an emerging
market setting and especially from a Turkish perspective.
Among papers that evaluate banking systems outside the US we
can mention Landskroner, Ruthenberg, and Zaken (2005) who
study the Israeli banks’ investments across business units to
evaluate whether consolidation in the Israeli banking industry
led to efficiency gains due to diversification. Their results sug-
gest that there are gains to diversification and that risk adjusted
performance is mostly consistent with optimal portfolio choice.
Sanya andWolfe (2010) uses a panel dataset of 226 listed banks
across 11 emerging economies to show the effect of revenue
diversification on bank performance and risk. Their findings
highlight the positive impact of diversification in banks’ activ-
ities on the insolvency risk and profitability. As the measure of
risk in their research they use bank performance measures such
as return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE) adjusted
for risk as opposed to a stock price measure.
With regards to Turkish banks’ diversification and risk,
literature is even more limited. Among the few studies that we
found that focus on banks’ activities we can mention
Ozyildirim and Ozdincer (2011) who analyze whether banks’
deviation from the mainstream in terms of asset and liability
allocation increases their performance. In a study released in
2013, Gurbuz, Yanik, and Ayturk (2013) analyze the perfor-
mance of Turkish deposit banks (measured by ROA and ROE)
as a result of non-interest income generating activities (income
diversification) for the period of 2005e2011. Their results
show that income diversification increases risk-adjusted
financial performance of Turkish deposit banks. The authors
of this study also point out to the lack of literature that focuses
on the relationship between income diversification and finan-
cial performance of Turkish banks.
We can find more studies that focus on emerging market
equity returns in general. Among those Chen and Lee (2013)
showed that equity returns on the Taiwanese stock market can
be explained to a certain degree by the companies’ default risk.4. Data
We use data on the average monthly returns of thirteen
publicly traded commercial and investment banks in Turkey.3
This data comes from the Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE) and
is only available on a monthly basis. Our analysis excludes the
Turkish Banking Crisis (2001e2002) mainly because previous
research has shown that bank stock returns are not propor-
tional to their loan exposure and are not based on their fun-
damentals during crisis periods (Lau & McInish, 2003). For
this reason, we start our analysis in the first quarter of 2003
following the restructuring and consolidation of the banking
system in Turkey. Some of the variables in our estimations (i.e.
breakdown of loans in terms of maturity) are only available for
the 2003e2006 period.
Table 1 provides the summary statistics of equity returns
for the banks in the sample. Fig. 2 shows the median value of
the monthly returns and of the standard deviation of these
returns for the bank stocks under study. The figure and the data
reported in the table suggest a relatively non-volatile risk formonthly returns.
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Fig. 2. Bank risk and returns. This figure shows the median of the average
monthly returns (return variable) in a quarter as well as the standard deviation
of the average monthly returns in the same quarter (risk variable). Data was
obtained from Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE) and the Turkish Banks Asso-
ciation (TBB).
5 Stiroh (2006) uses revenue composition as a measure of his analysis, yet in
the case of Turkey preliminary estimations using revenue composition does
not necessarily yield any significant results. The same could be said for the
currency composition of the banks’ loan portfolio. Preliminary results
regarding this variable also suggested no statistical significance and redundant
variable testing proved this measure not to be a significant explanatory vari-
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corresponds to the Global Financial Crisis. We also see that
the monthly returns fell continuously between the first quarter
of 2008 until the second quarter of 2009 at a rate of over 14%,
6% and around 9% in the first, second and fourth quarter of
this year respectively. The standard deviation of the average
monthly returns during this period jumps to a high of 29.33%
during the third quarter of 2008. Although this is not an all
time high in the sample, the duration of the high volatility is a
record for our sample period.4
Balance Sheet and Income Statement data are obtained from
the Banks Association of Turkey (TBB). This dataset covers a
period of 30 quarters (2002q4e2010q1) and is unbalanced due
to the unavailability of full data for some of the banks in the
sample. Some of the balance sheet variables pertaining to
maturity composition of bank loans can only be obtained until
the third quarter of 2006 limiting our ability for analysis in terms
of banks’ loans term composition. Table 2 provides the sum-
mary statistics of balance sheet and income statement variables
for the banks in the sample. The mean of total assets for the
banks in the sample is 28.5 billion TL which corresponds to
around 19 billion USD (based on an exchange rate of 1.5 TL per
USD). In terms of size, the sample includes a good range of
small and big banks in Turkey with assets ranging from 428
million TL to 134 billion TL as Table 2 shows. The wide range
allows us to better reflect the effects of diversification taking
into account banks’ size.
5. Empirical estimation
We follow an empirical model on evaluating risk of bank
holding companies (BHCs) proposed by Stiroh (2006) who4 The highest volatility in the sample is recorded for the first observation
(the fourth quarter of 2002) where the standard deviation of the average
monthly volatility reaches 32.58%. The high volatility in this period could be
considered a residual of the Turkish Banking Crisis of 2000e2001 during
which Savings Deposit Insurance Fund (TMSF) closed down eleven banks and
the Turkish Lira was devalued by 40% against the USD Tanyeri (2010).uses balance sheet and income statement variables. In the first
part of our estimation, we evaluate the effect of banks’
diversification on their loan portfolios in terms of maturity by
using the following specification5:
riski;t ¼ b0þ b1 lnðtai;t1Þ þ b2 lnðtai;t1Þ2 þ b3shloansi;t1
þ b4hhiðmatÞi;t1þ b5banki;t1þ b6foreignt
þ b7fincrisist þ 3i;t
ð1Þ
where riski,t is the risk for bank i in period t measured by the
standard deviation of monthly returns on the Istanbul Stock
Exchange during that period. We use two different calcula-
tions of risk in our estimations: first the three-month average
of the standard deviations of the monthly returns and also the
12 month average of the standard deviations of the monthly
returns. tai,t1 is total assets for bank i in period t  1. We use
one period lagged variables in the estimation since investors
make their portfolio decisions regarding each bank’s stock
based on last period’s financial information available. The
variable shloansi,t1 represents the ratio of the bank’s short
term loan portfolio to its overall loans, hhi(mat)i,t1 is the
calculated Herfindahl Hirschmann Index (HHI) value for the
bank’s loan composition in terms of maturity (the higher this
value, the more concentrated the bank’s loan portfolio is in
terms of maturity. See below for the calculation of this ratio)
banki,t1 is a vector of other bank specific variables obtained
from the balance sheets and income statements of the banks in
the sample and foreignt is a dummy variable based on bank’s
ownership structure.6 We do not use a lagged value for foreign
dummy since ownership change in banks is more readily
available information than bank specific variables and in-
vestors will make their decisions regarding buying or selling a
bank stock based on ownership information at time t as
opposed to t  1. Finally, fincrisis represents a dummy vari-
able for the Global Financial Crisis of 2008. It takes on the
value of 1 for the third quarter of 2008 and onwards till the
first quarter of 2010. We believe this is an important variable
to include in our estimation since previous research (such as
Hacihasanoglu, Simga-Mugan, & Soytas, 2012) has shown
that global risk perceptions have an important effect in
explaining emerging market return volatilities.7able in the case of Turkish banks.
6 We define a bank ”foreign” if the share of the foreign owner exceeds 50.
01% following IFRS standards. A redundancy test shows that foreignt is an
important variable in the estimations that cannot be considered redundant.
7 There are also studies that suggest the Global Financial Crisis had no
impact on the efficiency scores of Turkish banks (such as Gunay, 2012).
However as shown in Section 6 this variable becomes highly significant in the
estimation results.
Table 2
Descriptive statistics for bank specific variables.
Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. dev. Skewness Kurtosis
Assets (ta) 28,528.75 18,981.19 134,018.20 428.40 29,597.33 1.34 4.14
Loans (loans) 13,333.29 8026.68 57,978.95 155.23 14,336.26 1.33 3.78
FX Loans (fxloans) 4946.19 2874.67 26,793.77 45.50 5632.23 1.69 5.54
Short Term Loans (stloans) 3450.79 2656.84 12,868.65 8.94 2962.39 1.07 3.62
Nonint Income (nonii) 695.43 266.16 6392.15 1.28 1030.27 2.65 10.89
Operating Inc (oprinc) 1526.04 780.43 11,122.20 8.30 1870.36 2.06 7.70
Trading Inc (trainc) 68.67 16.07 1726.01 378.33 203.37 3.17 19.68
Dividend Inc (divinc) 8.74 1.22 408.46 0.00 32.07 8.36 91.17
Net Fee Inc (feeinc) 259.04 125.31 1725.07 0.69 329.06 1.99 6.89
Other Nonint Inc (othnonii) 361.08 94.86 5054.30 372.67 736.12 3.42 15.43
Deposits (deposits) 18,999.51 13,692.45 75,362.54 625.10 17,553.44 1.11 3.40
Equity (equity) 3330.79 1829.47 15,597.51 0.00 3573.20 1.43 4.37
Nonperforming Loans (npl) 661.72 390.36 3010.83 1.77 657.33 1.17 3.89
Offbalance Sheet Rev (offbal) 44,812.24 23,820.03 297,938.88 340.42 53,791.18 1.79 6.25
Operating Profit (profit) 389.48 164.53 3099.60 2603.75 551.94 1.40 8.72
The table shows the descriptive statistics of variables for 13 publicly traded banks used in estimations. Data is obtained from the Turkish Banks Association. The
number of observations is 381. All data is in terms of 1 million Turkish Lira (TL).
27E. Ozsoz et al. / Borsa I_stanbul Review 14 (2014) 23e31The bank specific vector of banki,t1 includes the following
variables that come from the bank’s balance sheet and income
statement in period t  1:
 Liability composition, measured by the ratio of deposits to
total assets (Deposits/Assets).
 Bank’s loans measured by total loan to total assets ratio
(Loans/Assets).
 Loan quality measured by the ratio of bank’s non-
performing loans to overall loan portfolio (Nonper-
forming Loan Ratio.)
 Off balance sheet activities measured by the ratio of
bank’s offbalance sheet income to its overall operating
profit (Offbalance Sheet Rev/Opr. Profit).
 Cost efficiency measured by the ratio of interest income
net of interest expense to bank’s equity (Cost Efficiency).
To capture the impact of banks’ diversification in loan
maturity we compute the Herfindahl Hirschmann Index (HHI)
for maturity structure as follows:
HHIðmatÞ ¼

stloans
loans
2
þ

ltloans
loans
2
ð2Þ
where,
loans¼ stloansþ ltloans ð3Þ
and stloans represents short-term loans. Similarly ltloans
stands for long term loans in the bank’s loan portfolio (loans).
HHI (mat) ranges between 0.50 and 1. An increase in this
variable indicates an increase in the concentration of a
particular type of loan in terms of maturity. The median value
for this ratio in the sample is 0.57 indicating that the loan
portfolios of the banks in the sample are fairly balanced. The
availability of loan data in terms of its maturity composition is
limited to 2002e2006 as indicated in Section 4.In the second part of our estimation, we evaluate the effect
of banks’ revenue composition on their overall risk. For this
analysis, we breakdown total revenue into two and five cate-
gories respectively. In the two category breakdown, we eval-
uate banks’ revenues in terms of:
1. Interest Income
2. Non-interest Income
and in the five-category breakdown, where we breakdown the
non-interest income further into its components as:
1. Interest income
2. Net fee income
3. Trading income
4. Dividend income
5. Other non-interest income
The estimation takes the following form for the two-
component breakdown:
riski;t ¼ b0þb1 lnðtai;t1Þþb2 lnðtai;t1Þ2þb3noniii;t1
þb4hhiðrev2Þi;t1þb5banki;t1þb6foreignt þ 3i;t ð4Þ
we do not include the fincrisis dummy in the above equation
since the regression period ends in the fourth quarter of 2006
prior to the onset of the Global Financial Crisis. The five-
component revenue breakdown takes the following form:
riski;t ¼ b0þ b1 lnðtai;t1Þ þ b2 lnðtai;t1Þ2 þ b3feeinci;t1
þ b4trainci;t1þ b5divinci;t1 þ b6othnoniii;t1
þ b7hhiðrev5Þi;t1þ b8banki;t1þ b9foreignt
þ b10fincrisist þ 3i;t ð5Þ
where noniii,t1 is the non-interest income as a ratio of oper-
ating revenue for bank i at time t  1, feeinci,t1 is the ratio of
28 E. Ozsoz et al. / Borsa I_stanbul Review 14 (2014) 23e31the bank’s total net fee income to operating revenue; trainc is
the trading income as a ratio of operating revenue and simi-
larly divinc, othnonii are the bank’s dividend and other non-
interest income calculated as a ratio of its operating revenue
respectively. The variable hhi(rev2) is the calculated Herfin-
dahl Hirschmann Index (HHI) value for the bank’s revenue
composition based on two-component categorization (interest
and non-interest income). The higher this value is, the more
concentrated the bank’s revenue becomes in terms of its source
(see below for the calculation of this ratio.) Similarly,
hhi(rev5) is the same ratio calculated as five-component
breakdown of the bank’s revenue sources.
The HHI ratios are calculated as follows:
HHIðrev2Þ ¼

intinc
oprinc
2
þ

nonii
oprinc
2
ð6Þ
where,
oprinc¼ intincþ nonii ð7Þ
for the two-component breakdown and,
HHIðrev5Þ ¼

intinc
oprinc
2
þ

feeinc
oprinc
2
þ

trainc
oprinc
2
þ

divinc
oprinc
2
þ

othnonii
oprinc
2
ð8Þ
where,
oprinc¼ intincþ feeincþ traincþ divincþ othnonii ð9Þ
for the five component breakdown: oprinc represents bank’s
operating income; feeinc is the ratio of the bank’s total net fee
income to operating revenue; intinc is the bank’s interest in-
come; trainc is the trading income as a ratio of operating
revenue and similarly divinc, othnonii are the bank’s dividend
and other non-interest income calculated as a ratio of its
operating revenue respectively.
In the panel estimation we use a joint cross-section and
period effects model. While each bank is different, each
quarter also is different in the sense that there are changes
within each bank’s loan portfolio and financial statement
variables.8 Even though period fixed effect methodology is
favored by Stiroh (2006), for the Turkish case we find that the
residuals are serially correlated using only a period-effects
model.8 Results of redundant fixed effects tests for the equation reveal the joint
significance of all of the effects, respectively. The cross-section/period f test
with 25 and 116 degrees of freedom has a critical value of 4.58 and a chi-
square critical value with 25 degrees of freedom of 104.48. Both these
tests have 0% probability which reject the null hypothesis that the restricted
model in which there is only a single intercept holds. In addition, in esti-
mations of the above equation using only a period effects model, we find that
the residual error terms are serially correlated and the DurbineWatson
Statistic is 1.37.6. Findings
Tables 3 and 4 show the results of estimations for bothmaturity
and revenue composition breakdowns using a list of bank specific
variables that aim to measure a bank’s liability composition,
liquidity level, loan quality, off-balance sheet activities, cost ef-
ficiency and the nature of its ownership. Additionally we also
include a time dummy for the Global Financial Crisis starting in
the third quarter of 2008. In Table 3 the “risk” variable is calcu-
lated using the three-month average of the standard deviation of a
bank’s monthly equity return while in estimations listed on
Table 4 we use the 12-month average of the standard deviations.9
The estimation results suggest that maturity composition of
a bank’s loan portfolio has a significant impact on its risk
factor when risk is calculated as the three month average of the
standard deviation of its monthly equity returns. The coeffi-
cient equals 26.8 which means for every one percent in-
crease in a bank’s short term loan ratio (calculated as the ratio
of short terms loans to the banks’ overall loan portfolio), the
three-month risk measure decreases 27%. However, we must
add that this should not be considered as conclusive evidence
since we only observe this significance at ten percent level and
only in one of the four estimations we run.
Of all the revenue components evaluated, we observe that a
bank’s trading income is a highly significant source of risk; the
higher the ratio of this variable in the bank’s overall revenue
composition, the riskier is the bank’s equity return. The coeffi-
cient of this variable ranges from 13 to 17 meaning a percentage
increase in a bank’s trading income relative to its operating in-
come increases the average standard deviation of its monthly
equity returns by 13% as shown in Table 4 to 17% as shown in
Table 3. This result may suggest that investors price a bank’s
trading activity into their investment decisions. Trading is seen by
Turkish equity investors as a riskier activity performed by banks
as opposed to more traditional banking activities such as lending.
Another revenue source that appears significant in some of
our estimations is the ratio of banks’ other non-interest income
to their operating income. The coefficient of this variable is
significant and positive in our estimations when we use the 12
month-average based risk measure. A coefficient of 10 sug-
gests a 10 percent increase in the 12-month average of the
standard deviation of a bank’s monthly equity return in the
face of a percentage increase in this ratio.
Among bank specific variables that we use in our estimations,
we find that the relative size of banks’deposits is an important risk
mitigating factor. The coefficient of this variable which is
measured as the ratio of total deposits to banks’ assets in the
previous period ranges from49 to65 suggesting a percentage
increase in bank deposits relative to total assets lowers equity risk
by almost half-a-standard deviation. That is a significant impact
given the magnitude. Equity enters our estimations as highly
significant and with a negative sign suggesting that banks with
higher equity have lower equity return risks. Also and as highly
expected, an increase in the ratio of banks’ non-performing loans9 We thank the referee for this suggestion.
Table 3
Determinants of bank risk in Turkey e revenue and maturity breakdown using risk calculation in a 3-month rolling window.
Time period Bank risk
Maturity composition of loans Two-part revenue breakdown Five-part revenue breakdown
2003q1e2006q4 2003q1e2006q4 2003q1e2010q1 2003q1e2010q1 2003q1e2010q1 2003q1e2010q1
Dependent variable:
ln (Assets) 1.85 (1.82) 52.39 (35.91) 5.51** (2.69) 2.14 (20.17) 7.42** (3.25) 48.17 (33.81)
ln (Assets)2 1.47 (1.09) 0.10 (0.60) 1.17 (0.97)
Short Term Loans/Loans 2.58 (11.27) 26.78* (16.50)
Loan Maturity HHI 1.72 (13.34) 12.30 (16.55)
Nonint inc/Opr. Rev 4.52 (4.39) 0.59 (5.83) 40.81 (36.75) 41.16 (36.87)
Revenue HHI (Two component) 4.59 (5.48) 4.87 (5.74)
Net Fee Inc/Operating Rev 3.87 (10.95) 2.48 (10.99)
Trading Inc/Operating Rev 16.33** (7.39) 17.06** (7.40)
Dividend Inc/Operating Rev 104.67 (121.58) 107.21 (121.45)
Other Nonint Inc/Operating Rev 10.88 (7.41) 11.47 (7.42)
Revenue HHI (Five Component) 11.09 (7.93) 7.09 (8.58)
Bank specific variables:
Deposits/Assets 5.27 (18.48) 24.37 (25.26) 49.53** (15.20) 49.12*** (15.41) 62.07*** (17.64) 64.57*** (17.74)
ln (Equity/Assets) 5.77 (4.01) 1.49 (5.51) 6.75*** (2.87) 6.99 (3.21) 8.76*** (3.66) 7.17* (3.88)
Loans/Assets 17.69* (10.05) 14.29 (15.73) 9.50 (10.59) 9.24 (10.72) 15.15 (13.89) 18.83 (13.71)
Nonperforming Loan Ratio 52.22*** (18.85) 50.29 (41.85) 19.08 (22.78) 18.66 (22.95) 15.70 (29.89) 14.12 (29.89)
Offbalance Sheet Rev/Opr. Profit 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.001) 0.00 (0.001) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00)
Cost Efficiency 8.57** (4.31) 6.75 (6.89) 2.61 (3.64) 2.53 (3.68) 7.26 (4.41) 7.07 (4.41)
Foreign Bank Dummy 3.99 (2.88) 8.80* (5.12) 8.75*** (3.63) 8.63*** (3.63) 4.54 (3.98) 4.73 (3.97)
Financial Crisis Dummy 6.57*** (1.73) 6.67*** (1.81) 8.68*** (2.07) 8.29*** (2.09)
Adj. R2 0.16 0.48 0.36 0.36 0.46 0.46
Number of banks 11 11 11 11 10 10
Number of observations 152 152 295 295 223 223
This table presents the results of estimations on bank risk by using Equations (1), (4) and (5). Bank risk is measured by the standard deviation of average monthly
returns in a quarter. All variables except Foreign Bank Dummy are lagged one period. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. *significant at 10 percent;
**significant at 5 percent; ***significant at 1 percent.
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tionship is robust in almost all of our estimations and its coeffi-
cient ranges from 33 to 51 suggesting that a one percent increase
in the NPL ratio will raise the average standard deviation of
monthly equity returns by 30e50 percent. We cannot however
find any conclusive evidence that suggests that cost efficiency
which is measured by the ratio of banks’ net interest income to
their equity lowers equity risk. On the other hand, the foreign
ownership dummy seems to have a significant and robust effect
with a negative coefficient in almost all of the estimations sug-
gesting that investors foresee foreign owned banks as relatively
safer than locally owned banks in Turkey. Alternatively, this
suggests that locally owned banks have higher risk associated
with them as opposed to foreign owned ones. This finding is in
line with existing literature.
Regarding the impact of the Global Financial Crisis we
observe that as expected the volatility of bank returnswere higher
during this crisis period compared to other periods. The fact that
the significance of this dummy variable is high and robust in all
estimations suggest that it was an important risk factor for the
equity returns of Turkish banks after the third quarter of 2008.
The estimations however fail to find any robust significant
relationship regarding the HHI concentration ratios we have
utilized in the study. This finding suggests concentration in
terms of maturity of loans or revenue breakdown is not
necessarily considered by investors as a significant risk factor
in the equity pricing of Turkish banks.7. Conclusion
By using data from thirteen publicly traded commercial and
deposit banks in Turkey, in this paper we estimate the de-
terminants of risk for bank equities in the case of an emerging
market setting, Turkey. Our analysis is the first according to
our knowledge that studies risk from an equity return
perspective in Turkey as applied to the banking sector. Our
findings suggest important conclusions regarding the nature of
risk for Turkish banks.
We find that maturity composition of a bank’s loans is a
good indicator of the volatility of its equity returns. The
rationale here is that banks with shorter loan maturity posi-
tions carry less maturity mismatch risk and are regarded by
investors as safer companies to invest in. In the case of
Turkish bank stocks, a one percent increase in the short term
maturity composition of a bank’s loans lowers its average
return volatility by almost a quarter standard deviation.
Another important conclusion we can arrive from the analysis
presented here is that the source of revenue for banks also
serves as a good predictor of their equity volatility in the case
of Turkey. In that regard, we see that increases in trading
income as a source of banks’ overall revenue increases the
volatility of their equity returns. This finding suggests that for
investors banks’ income statements are as important as their
balance sheets and the volatile nature of banks’ trading rev-
enue is regarded as a source of risk for profitability. This
Table 4
Determinants of bank risk in Turkey e revenue and maturity breakdown using risk calculation in a 12-month rolling window.
Time period Bank risk
Maturity composition of loans Two-part revenue breakdown Five-part revenue breakdown
2003q1e2006q4 2003q1e2006q4 2003q1e2010q1 2003q1e2010q1 2003q1e2010q1 2003q1e2010q1
Dependent variable:
ln (Assets) 1.69* (0.89) 90.66*** (18.17) 8.41*** (1.48) 11.94 (10.94) 9.41*** (1.77) 20.46 (18.60)
ln (Assets)2 2.52*** (0.54) 0.61* (0.32) 0.31 (0.53)
Short Term Loans/Loans 3.15 (5.50) 10.47 (8.49)
Loan Maturity HHI 1.54 (6.50) 5.44 (8.38)
Nonint inc/Opr. Rev 0.75 (2.09) 1.13 (2.96) 17.30 (20.03) 19.38 (19.97)
Revenue HHI (Two component) 4.74* (3.00) 3.07 (3.12)
Net Fee Inc/Operating Rev 0.18 (5.90) 0.15 (5.94)
Trading Inc/Operating Rev 12.63*** (4.04) 12.76*** (4.05)
Dividend Inc/Operating Rev 13.11 (65.67) 13.71 (65.79)
Other Nonint Inc/Operating Rev 10.38*** (4.00) 10.38*** (4.01)
Revenue HHI (Five Component) 5.04 (4.35) 6.07 (4.68)
Bank specific variables:
Deposits/Assets 12.770 (9.03) 1.30 (12.84) 48.66*** (8.30) 46.29*** (8.36) 53.61*** (9.54) 54.23*** (9.61)
ln (Equity/Assets) 0.38 (1.93) 4.33* (2.79) 7.32*** (1.74) 8.78*** (1.75) 7.56*** (1.98) 7.11*** (2.12)
Loans/Assets 6.93 (4.89) 19.15** (8.13) 12.88** (5.89) 11.31** (5.93) 16.72** (7.57) 17.64** (7.74)
Nonperforming Loan Ratio (4.89) (9.06) 50.47** (21.14) 42.94*** (12.48) 40.55*** (12.45) 33.26** (16.25) 32.53** (16.32)
Offbalance Sheet Rev/Opr. Profit 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00)
Cost Efficiency 1.87 (2.07) 1.84 (3.50) 2.15 (1.98) 2.63 (1.99) 0.35 (2.37) 0.29 (2.38)
Foreign Bank Dummy 0.01 (1.39) 3.54 (2.60) 10.35*** (1.94) 9.65*** (1.96) 8.65*** (2.14) 8.69*** (2.14)
Financial Crisis Dummy 9.89*** (0.95) 10.44*** (0.98) 10.30*** (1.12) 10.21*** (1.13)
Adj. R2 0.37 0.53 0.56 0.57 0.63 0.63
Number of banks 11 11 11 11 10 10
Number of observations 146 146 289 289 218 218
This table presents the results of estimations on bank risk by using Equations (1), (4) and (5). Bank risk is measured by the standard deviation of average monthly
returns in a year. Cost efficiency is calculated by the ratio of net interest income (interest income after interest expense) to equity; Financial Crisis Dummy
represent the Global Financial Crisis Dummy and takes the value of 1 from 2008Q3 to 2010Q1 and is omitted from regressions that do not include this time frame.
All variables except Foreign Bank Dummy are lagged one period. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. *significant at 10 percent; **significant at 5
percent; ***significant at 1 percent.
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regulators; bank managers who rely on trading revenue as a
significant contributor of their bank’s overall revenue inad-
vertently cause their bank stock to become more volatile; from
regulators’ perspective it suggests banks’ trading activity is a
source of risk to banks’ overall health and thus needs to be
more closely watched.
In terms of other bank specific variables used in our anal-
ysis, our results reaffirm our expectations regarding sources of
equity return risk: an increase in Turkish banks’ deposits and
equity relative to their assets are all risk mitigating factors that
lower equity volatility while the ratio of non-performing loans
to banks’ overall loan portfolio increase the volatility of equity
returns. We also empirically show that the Global Financial
Crisis had an observable and significant impact on equity
returns in Turkey. Our findings also show that there is a robust
and significant link between a bank’s ownership status and its
equity return volatility in Turkey. It is observed that Turkish
equity investors consider foreign owned banks as less risky.
This finding strengthens the limited number of studies in
literature for Turkey and other emerging market banking
systems.1010 Such as Isik and Hassan (2003), Micco et al. (2004).The findings in this paper can be used to extend the study of
banks in Turkey and in other emerging markets. Further
research can study the reasons why equity investors perceive
foreign owned banks as less risky as opposed to domestic
ones. Future research can also look at if indeed as perceived
more trading activity as suggested by this paper leads to lower
or more volatile profitability in Turkish banking sector. As we
conducted our literature survey we realized that the field still
suffered from a lack of studies regarding these questions.References
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